Mogadishu, Somalia — When Somalia launched its military offensive against al-Shabab in August 2022, hopes were high for a turning point in the fight against one of Africa’s deadliest insurgent groups.
Initial victories in central regions like Hirshabelle and Galmudug spurred optimism that the Somali National Army (SNA), backed by local militias and international partners, was on the brink of breaking al-Shabaab’s stranglehold.
But nearly two years later, the campaign has lost momentum. Operations have stalled, deadlines for liberation have repeatedly been extended, and concerns are mounting about the Somali government’s ability to maintain its gains as international peacekeepers prepare to exit.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who returned to power in 2022 pledging to make security his top priority, initially set a five-month timeline in 2023 to drive al-Shabab out of its strongholds.
By late 2023, those goals were pushed to the end of 2024, and now to April 2025.
“This war is not just about bullets and bombs,” said Ahmed Ali, a security analyst based in Mogadishu.
“It’s about governance, reconciliation, and addressing the very grievances that allow al-Shabab to thrive. Without that, you can push them out of towns, but they’ll come back.”
Al-Shabab controls large swathes of rural Somalia and maintains an extensive financial network, extorting taxes and smuggling goods through informal routes.
The group’s ability to adapt to military pressure, experts say, underscores the limits of a purely military approach.
Compounding the challenges is the phased withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), set to end by December 2024.
ATMIS has played a crucial role in providing a security buffer and logistical support to Somali forces. However, with its drawdown accelerating, Somali forces are expected to take on greater responsibilities, working alongside the incoming, albeit smaller, African Union mission known as AUSSOM.
“The ATMIS withdrawal is a ticking time bomb,” said Fatima Hassan, a Nairobi-based researcher specializing in Somali security.
“If Somali forces are not ready—and right now, they’re not—al-Shabab could exploit the gaps to stage a resurgence.”
Somali officials have repeatedly said they are building capacity to fill the void left by ATMIS, with support from the U.S., Turkey, and other allies.
However, one foreign diplomat based in Mogadishu speaking on condition of anonymity expressed skepticism:
“The government is trying to do too much, too fast, with too few resources.”
Al-Shabaab’s Resilience
Despite military setbacks, al-Shabab continues to launch high-profile attacks, including a suicide bombing in Mogadishu in October that killed dozens.
The group has also stepped up its operations across border areas, particularly near neighboring Kenya, highlighting its ability to project power beyond Somalia’s borders.
“Al-Shabaab’s resilience lies in its ability to embed itself in the local fabric,” said Maryan Abdullahi, a Somali journalist covering the insurgency.
“They exploit political crisis and clan rivalries to their advantage.”
For many Somalis, al-Shabaab’s presence is as much a political problem as a military one.
In areas where government forces have taken control, residents complain of insufficient follow-through to establish governance and provide basic services.
These challenges and stagnation appear to have influenced international support, prompting strategic shifts among Somalia’s international donors, who remain committed to investing in the country’s stabilization.
The U.S. has ramped up drone strikes targeting al-Shabab leaders, while Turkey remains a key partner in training Somali forces.
The European Union has also provided significant funding to sustain the Somali military and ATMIS.
But some analysts argue that international strategies need recalibration.
“Somalia doesn’t just need troops; it needs a functioning state,” said Mohamed Ali, a former senior advisor at the Somali security ministry.
“This means fixing the political system, improving governance, and addressing the economic drivers of the conflict. Otherwise, this cycle will repeat.”
A Historical Long War
The roots of the conflict stretch back decades.
Al-Shabab emerged in the mid-2000s as an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union, which briefly governed parts of Somalia before being ousted by an Ethiopian military intervention.
Over the years, the group has evolved into one of the world’s most dangerous Islamist insurgencies, exploiting Somalia’s weak state institutions, clan divisions, and geographic vastness to maintain its foothold.
Previous Somali administrations have tried—and failed—to decisively defeat the group.
The current government’s campaign is the most ambitious yet, but its success remains uncertain.
Looking ahead, Somalia faces a critical juncture. The government struggles to sustain its military gains and also deliver the governance and development that have long been missing.
Meanwhile, the April 2025 deadline for liberation looms, even as international partners weigh how much more they can invest.
For now, the fight against al-Shabab is far from over.
As one Somali elder in Hirshabelle put it: “We have seen them leave before, only to return. This time must be different.”
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