Mogadishu, Somalia – As Somalia’m steps up its campaign against al-Shabab and ISIS, an unexpected battle is unfolding—not in the deserts or jungles where militants operate, but in mosques, academic circles, and social media forums.
The debate centers on a question of definition: How should these groups be characterized?
The disagreement has drawn in clerics, political commentators, and security experts, revealing deep ideological and political fault lines that could shape the future of Somalia’s counterterrorism efforts.
For years, Somalia’s religious scholars have largely agreed on condemning al-Shabab and ISIS.
The government-backed Supreme Council of Scholars has issued fatwas denouncing the groups, urging Somalis to reject them and join the army to fight them. But a new controversy has emerged over the specific language used to describe the militants.
Many government-aligned scholars have referred to them as “Khawarij”—a historical term for rebels who deviate from mainstream Islam. Others have taken a more extreme stance, labeling them nonbelievers (kuffar) and calling for their execution without trial.
However, some clerics are now resisting this characterization.
While they still call for a fight against the groups, they argue that al-Shabab and ISIS members remain Muslims who have strayed rather than outright apostates.
The distinction, though subtle, has ignited a fierce backlash, with critics accusing these clerics of providing ideological cover for militants.
“This is not just about words,” said Dr. Abdirahman Ali, a Mogadishu-based expert on religious extremism.
“Language defines legitimacy. If al-Shabab is declared non-Muslim, it removes any theological justification for dialogue or defection. But if they are seen as misguided Muslims, it leaves room for reconciliation.”
GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND RELIGIOUS RHETORIC
The Somali government, with backing from the United States and African Union forces, has intensified military operations in recent months, recapturing territory from al-Shabab in central and southern Somalia.
But military success alone is not enough. Winning the ideological war is just as critical, experts say.
For years, al-Shabab has used religious rhetoric to justify its insurgency.
The group brands itself as the true defender of Islam, portraying the Somali government as an illegitimate entity controlled by foreign forces.
In response, the government has worked closely with religious scholars to delegitimize al-Shabab’s ideology, framing it as an extremist offshoot far removed from mainstream Islam.
“The government’s religious strategy is clear,” said Ahmed Farah, a policy analyst in Nairobi.
“By using terms like ‘Khawarij,’ they strip al-Shabab of any religious legitimacy while avoiding the controversial claim that they are outright nonbelievers.”
But the latest controversy has complicated this narrative.
Some clerics are now urging caution, arguing that branding al-Shabab members as apostates could backfire by making them more resistant to surrender.
However, the debate is not purely academic. Experts warn that the lack of a unified religious stance could have consequences for Somalia’s security strategy.
“If the government and religious scholars are not on the same page, it creates openings for extremists to exploit,” said Colonel Mohamed Hassan, a former intelligence officer.
“Al-Shabab thrives on propaganda. If they can convince their fighters that they are still part of the Muslim community, they can maintain recruitment and morale.”
There is precedent for such a scenario.
In the early 2000s, Somalia’s warlords were largely united in their opposition to Islamist militias. But their lack of ideological cohesion allowed al-Shabab’s predecessors to present themselves as the only legitimate Islamic alternative to the chaos of warlord rule.
According to experts, the current dispute could play into al-Shabab’s hands, giving them a counter-narrative to push against government-backed clerics.
Already, militant-linked social media accounts have started amplifying the voices of scholars who reject the nonbeliever label, using their words to suggest that some religious authorities sympathize with them, according to counterterrorism experts closely monitoring the group’s online activities.
Meanwhile, the controversy has also fueled public suspicion.
On social media and in political discussions, some commentators have accused clerics who oppose calling al-Shabab nonbelievers of secretly sympathizing with terrorists.
“It is shocking to see some religious leaders say that al-Shabab are still Muslims,” said Halima Abdi, a university student in Mogadishu.
“They kill innocent people. They destroy our country. Why should we still see them as part of our religion?”
Others argue that the clerics are simply taking a theologically cautious stance, avoiding a declaration of apostasy that could have wider implications.
“This is a classic theological debate that goes back centuries,” said Professor Ibrahim Haji, an Islamic studies scholar.
“The question of whether someone who commits extreme violence is still a Muslim is not unique to Somalia—it has been debated throughout Islamic history.”
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
For now, the military campaign against al-Shabab and ISIS continues. Somali forces, with U.S. drone support and African Union reinforcements, are making significant territorial gains.
But whether these gains will be sustained depends in part on whether Somalia’s leaders and religious scholars can agree on a unified ideological message.
“The government must tread carefully,” said analyst Ahmed Farah.
“If it allows divisions to grow over how to frame the fight against al-Shabab, it risks undermining the very progress it has made.”
For many Somalis, the focus remains on eradicating extremism—however it is defined.
But as the battle shifts from the battlefield to the realm of religious interpretation, the government faces a new challenge: ensuring that its own allies do not become divided over the very nature of the fight itself.
